Few days ago, I hit on this quotation about Galen Strawson's thought.
# We do what we do, in a given situation, because we are what we are.
# In order to be ultimately responsible for what we do, we have to be ultimately responsible for what we are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.
# But we cannot, as the first point avers, be ultimately responsible for what we are, because, simply, we are what we are; we cannot be causa sui.
# Therefore, we cannot be ultimately responsible for what we do.
Ok, this is the kind of "logicism" which I don't like.
Logically speaking, it is correct. And my logic friend -e.g. Eugenio- would love it. But I'm sick of mere formalism. "Is logic empirical?" wonders Hilary Putnam. Not all the way long. Let's say we take into consideration all above seriously; who can be accused for something?
I firmly think what once was taught me (by someone I know and who is the embody representation of the Kantian "I ought" for her coherence in life): we are what we are, but as soon as we start to be conscious of what we are doing, let's say legally commencing on 18 years old, we can and we have to choose
how to live our life. Basically I know who I am, I know I could be, for instance, very cutting with people, but if I want I can hide this part of me. Because at the end I can consider myself a kind of responsible for how I behave and for how I shape myself.
Ok. We can discuss about the meaning which Strawson would like to give to "ultimately", but anyway, I think there is the free will.
Maybe someone has already done these objections in many more sharp and witty ways, but anyway, this is my little blog... :-)
